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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the incentives for governments to impose export subsidies when firms 
invest in a cost saving technology before market competition. Governments first impose an 
export subsidy or a tax. After observing export policy, firms invest in cost reducing R&D and 
subsequently compete in the market. Governments subsidize exports under Cournot 
competition. Under Bertrand competition, export subsidies are positive whenever R&D is 
sufficiently cost-effective at reducing marginal costs, and negative otherwise. The trade 
policy reversal found in models without endogenous sunk costs disappears if R&D is 
sufficiently cost-effective. Thus, output subsidies seem more robust than implied by the 
recent literature. 
 
JEL Classification: F12, F13, L13. 
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1 Introduction
Since Eaton and Grossman (1986), one of the major criticisms of the strategic
trade literature has been its non-robustness to the mode of market competi-
tion. If trade policy is sensitive to the choice of strategic variable by firms
and governments are uncertain about the mode of competition then strategic
trade policy can be more harmful than beneficial. In this paper, we analyze
export subsidies when firms invest in cost-reducing R&D before the market
competition stage. Governments choose export subsidies first. After observing
governments’ choice, firms invest in R&D and then compete in a third market
(in prices or quantities). We find that for sufficiently cost effective R&D1 gov-
ernments subsidize exports independently of the mode of competition. This
suggests that export subsidies are more robust to the type of the market com-
petition than implied by the recent literature.
Several authors have studied the robustness of strategic trade policy using
two kinds of models. In the first kind, in a two-stage game, governments first
commit to output subsidies and then firms compete in the market. Using this
approach Brander and Spencer (1985) show that the optimal trade policy is
an export subsidy under Cournot competition. Eaton and Grossman (1986),
however, show that the optimal strategic trade policy reverses to an export
tax if firms compete in prices.2 This policy reversal highlights the lack of
robustness of strategic trade policy when governments are uncertain about the
mode of competition.
In the second kind of models, actions are chosen in a three-stage game:
governments first commit to a policy, firms then invest in R&D and later com-
pete in the market. In such models, investing in a strategic variable before the
market competition stage captures entry barriers, a feature that is fundamental
to oligopolistic market structures (see Sutton, 1991). A further appeal of these
models is that they capture firm commitment to a strategic variable before the
competition stage (Grossman, 1988). If firms can make sunk investments be-
fore the market competition stage then governments have two instruments at
their disposal: output and R&D subsidies. If governments use only R&D policy
Bagwell and Staiger (1994) show that governments subsidize R&D under both
Cournot and Bertrand Competition.3 Based on this, Brander (1995) suggests
1We refer to the cost-effectiveness of R&D as the effect of R&D on marginal costs relative
to the cost of investing in R&D.
2The reversal in the optimal export policy is explained by the fact that outputs are strate-
gic substitutes and prices are strategic complements. See Brander (1995) for a discussion on
this.
3Spencer and Brander (1983) had shown the optimality of R&D subsidies under Cournot
competition. Bagwell and Staiger (1994) develop a model where the effect of R&D investment
is stochastic. In the case where R&D reduces the mean but does not affect the variance of
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that R&D subsidies seem more robust than output subsidies. Neary and Leahy
(2000), however, dispute Brander’s claim.4 They show that when governments
use two instruments (an output and a R&D subsidy at the same time) then
both instruments are not robust to the nature of market competition.5
This paper adds another argument against the claim that R&D subsidies
are more robust than output subsidies. If governments only subsidize exports
and firms invest in R&D (before competing in the market), we show that the
optimal trade policy is an export subsidy under both Cournot and Bertrand
competition, provided R&D is sufficiently cost-effective. This means that out-
put policy is more robust than previously considered by the literature. This is
true especially in industries where the marginal cost of R&D is not too high
relative to its effect on process innovation.
The papers closest to ours are Spencer and Brander (1983) and Neary and
Leahy (2000). Spencer and Brander (1983) show that governments impose
an output subsidy under Cournot competition when firms can invest in R&D
before competing in the market. They analyze two cases that are different to
ours. First, they show the optimality of output subsidies if they are set by
governments after firms decide their R&D investment. Second, they show that
output subsidies are optimal if they are set jointly with R&D subsidies before
R&D is chosen by firms. In the first part of our paper, we extend their results
to the case when R&D subsidies are not available and the government chooses
output subsidies before firms invest in R&D.
In a numerical simulation, Neary and Leahy (2000) show that if govern-
ments only use output subsidies then the Eaton and Grossman trade policy
reversal from Cournot to Bertrand competition is still observed when firms in-
vest in R&D before the market competition stage. In this paper, we show that
their result holds only when R&D is relatively ineffective at reducing marginal
costs. Our result becomes clear once one realizes that the effect of R&D on
profits depends on the level of output. Due to output expansion, an export
subsidy increases the ability of domestic R&D to shift profits from the foreign
costs (the closest case to deterministic R&D), they find that R&D should be subsidized under
both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Maggi (1996) finds a similar result in a model where
firms invest in capacities (instead of R&D) before the competition stage. The optimal policy
in his model is to subsidize capacities.
4See Neary and Leahy (2000), page 505.
5Neary and Leahy (2000) show that under Cournot competition governments subsidize ex-
ports and tax R&D, a result found in Spencer and Brander (1983). However, under Bertrand
competition, governments will tax exports and subsidize R&D. The intuition is that gov-
ernments use export policy to shift profits from foreign firms (as in models without R&D)
and use R&D policy to correct the distortion on R&D generated by the strategic behavior
of firms. Therefore, if governments use two instruments, strategic policy in the presence of
R&D is no longer robust to changes in the mode of competition.
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firm. Output expansion, due to the output subsidy, occurs under both Cournot
and Bertrand competition. Therefore, only looking at R&D, governments have
the incentive to subsidize exports both under price and quantity competition.
The sign of the optimal policy depends upon the net effect of the export
subsidy on the R&D and the market competition stage. In a model without
R&D, the sign of the strategic trade policy depends on the strategic comple-
mentarity or substitutability of the variables chosen by firms in the market
competition stage. Under R&D and Cournot competition, a unilateral ex-
port subsidy increases welfare both through its effect on R&D and on output.
This means that governments want to subsidize exports (Spencer and Brander,
1983). Under Bertrand competition, however, the two effects have the opposite
sign. If R&D is sufficiently cost effective then R&D will be relatively elastic
with respect to an export subsidy. This high elasticity of R&D will make the
effect of the output subsidy on the R&D stage stronger than the effect on
the price competition stage. In this case, governments subsidize output under
Bertrand competition. Conversely, if R&D is not sufficiently cost-effective then
the effect of an output subsidy on the price competition stage dominates the
effect on the R&D stage and the optimal policy under Bertrand competition
is an output tax.
We use the standard third country model of strategic trade as in Spencer
and Brander (1983). Two firms, one located in each country, produce a dif-
ferentiated good which is exported to a third country. There is no domes-
tic consumption and welfare is measured as producer surplus (profits) net of
subsidy costs.6 In a three stage game of complete information, the domestic
government first sets an output subsidy s1. This is followed by both firms si-
multaneously deciding their investment in cost-reducing R&D (∆i and ∆j). In
the third stage, firms compete in the product market simultaneously choosing
quantities, or prices. We also assume that governments commit to an export
subsidy while firms commit to their investment in R&D.
We proceed as follows: in section 2 we analyze output subsidies under
Cournot competition. In section 3 we perform the same analysis under Bertrand
competition. Section 4 presents a numerical simulation that highlights the ef-
fect of the convexity of the cost of R&D on the optimal trade policy. Section
5 concludes.
6Public funds may have an opportunity cost bigger than one (as in Neary [1994]). We
abstract from this issue in this analysis.
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2 Cournot Competition
In the first stage of the game, government 1 chooses an export subsidy. Then
firms choose R&D investment. Output is chosen in the third stage of the game.
R&D investment generates a process innovation of size ∆i (by firm i), imposing
a monetary cost of φ(∆i) upon the firm. The monetary cost is increasing and
convex in the extent of process innovation and reduces total and marginal costs
of production. Denoting firms by superscripts and derivatives by subscripts
these assumptions translate into:
Ci∆ =
∂Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i
≤ 0, Ci∆∆ =
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂ (∆i)2
≥ 0, (1)
Cix∆ =
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi
≤ 0
φii(∆
i) > 0, φiii(∆
i) > 0
The choice of R&D investment is irreversible and simultaneous for both firms.
We assume that goods are imperfect substitutes and that the own-price effect
dominates the cross-price effect:7
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xi
<
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xj
< 0 (2)
We also assume the following about revenues Ri(xi, xj) = xipi(xi, xj):
Riii(x
i, xj) = xi
∂2pi(xi, xj)
∂ (xi)2
+ 2
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xi
< 0 (3)
Rijj(x
i, xj) = xi
∂2pi(xi, xj)
∂ (xj)2
≥ 0 (4)
Riij(x
i, xj) = xi
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xi∂xj
+
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xj
< 0 (5)
Assumption (3) states that the revenue is concave in own quantity, and is
satisfied by demand functions that are not too convex. Assumption (4) states
that revenue decreases (at a decreasing rate) with an increase in the other
firm’s output. This is true in particular for linear demands. Lastly, (5) states
that an increase in sales of one good decreases marginal revenue of the other
(again satisfied in the case of a linear demand).
7Strictly speaking, the condition for the own price effect to dominate the cross price
effect is
(
∂pi(xi,xj)
∂xj
)2
<
(
∂pi(xi,xj)
∂xi
)2
. In this paper we restrict our attention to the case of
imperfect substitutes, that is ∂p
i(xi,xj)
∂xj
< 0.
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Suppose that government 1 subsidizes exports giving a per-unit output
subsidy, s1, to its domestic firm. The profit function of firm 1 and firm 2 can
then be written as,
Π¯1(x1, x2,∆1, s1) = R1(x1, x2)−C1(x1,∆1)− φ(∆1) + s1x1
= Π1(x1, x2,∆1) + s1x1
Π¯2(x1, x2,∆2) = Π2(x1, x2,∆2) = R2(x1, x2)−C2(x2,∆2)− φ(∆2)
The net domestic benefit of country 1 is simply the profit of the domestic firm
minus the cost of the subsidy,
B¯1(s1) = Π¯1(x1, x2,∆1, s1)− s1x1 = Π1(x1, x2,∆1)
2.1 Final Stage: Quantity Competition
In the final stage, firms choose output, xi, to maximize profits, Π¯i(x1, x2,∆i, s1).
The first order condition for the two firms gives us the following expressions:
Π¯11 = R
1
1(x
1, x2)−C1x(x
1,∆1) + s1 = 0 (6)
Π¯22 = R
2
2(x
1, x2)−C2x(x
2,∆2) = 0 (7)
with second order condition:8
Π¯iii = R
i
ii(x
i, xj)−Cixx(x
i,∆i) < 0 (8)
We assume that the second order condition is always satisfied.9 Note that
assumption (5) implies that quantities are strategic substitutes, and therefore
output reaction functions are negatively sloped.
For later use we need to assume that the own effect of output on marginal
profit is stronger (greater in absolute value) than the cross effect, that is,
Π¯iii < Π¯
i
ij . This then implies that:
Π¯111Π¯
2
22 − Π¯
1
12Π¯
2
12 > 0 (9)
The solution of the two equations in (6) gives us equilibrium outputs (as
a function of R&D levels chosen in the second stage and the output subsidy
chosen by government 1 in the first stage):
xi = q¯i(∆i,∆j , s1)
8Note that Π¯iii = Π
i
ii and Π¯
i
ij = Π
i
ij are the same as under free trade.
9This will be satisfied if marginal costs are increasing or do not decrease faster than
marginal revenue.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA      13 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0701 
Totally differentiating the two first order conditions (6) and (7) we obtain
the effect of R&D on output (keeping the output subsidy constant):
q¯i∆i(∆
i,∆j, s1) =
dxi
d∆i
=
Π¯jjjC
i
x∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj −R
j
ijR
i
ij
=
Π¯jjjC
i
x∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
> 0 (10)
q¯i∆j (∆
i,∆j , s1) =
dxi
d∆j
=
−RiijC
j
x∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj −R
j
ijR
i
ij
=
−Π¯iijC
j
x∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
< 0 (11)
where the inequalities come from (1), (5) and (8). The intuition is straightfor-
ward: an increase in R&D expenditure reduces the marginal cost of production
and thus shifts out the reaction curve of firm i. Given that reaction functions
are downward sloping, this implies that firm i produces more output while firm
j produces less. The effect of the subsidy (s1) on output is also determined by
the effect the output subsidy has on R&D of both firms. Keeping R&D levels
∆1 and ∆2 fixed, the partial effects are,
q¯1s1(∆
1,∆2, s1)
∣∣
∆1,∆2 constant
=
−Π¯222
Π¯111Π¯
2
22 −R
2
12R
1
12
> 0 (12)
q¯2s1(∆
1,∆2, s1)
∣∣
∆1,∆2 constant
=
R212
Π¯111Π¯
2
22 −R
2
12R
1
12
=
Π¯212
Π¯111Π¯
2
22 − Π¯
2
12Π¯
1
12
< 0
(13)
The partial effects state that own output is increasing in own (subsidy) and
decreasing in the other subsidy. However, R&D levels are influenced by the
choice of output subsidies. Therefore, the total effect of a change in s1 should
take this into account. (Expressions for q¯1
s1
and q¯2
s1
above would be relevant if
output subsidies are chosen after R&D levels are set.)
2.2 R&D investment
In the R&D (i.e. second) stage, we can rewrite the profit of a firm as a function
of R&D and output subsidies:
π¯i(∆i,∆j, s1) = Π¯i(q¯i(∆i,∆j, s
1), q¯j(∆i,∆j, s
1),∆i, s1)
= Ri(q¯i, q¯j)−Ci(q¯i,∆i)− φi(∆i) + s1q¯i
The first order condition for a Nash equilibrium in the choice of R&D is given
by the same first order condition as in the case of free trade:
π¯i∆i(∆
i,∆j, s1) = Rij(x
i, xj)q¯j
∆i
(∆i,∆j, s1)−Ci∆(x
i,∆i)− φii(∆
i) = 0 (14)
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With the second order condition,
π¯i∆i∆i(∆
i,∆j, s1) = Rij q¯
j
∆i∆i
+ q¯j
∆i
dRij(x
i, xj)
d∆i
−Cix∆q¯
i
∆i−C
i
∆∆−φ
i
ii < 0. (15)
Where,
dRij(x
i,xj)
d∆i
= Riij(x
i, xj)q¯i
∆i
+ Rijj(x
i, xj)q¯j
∆i
< 0 (by (4), (5), (10) and
(11)) and q¯j
∆i
dRij(x
i,xj)
d∆i
−Cix∆q¯
i
∆i
> 0.10
We now assume a condition similar to (9). It refers to the effect of R&D
on profits. Again, assuming that own effect of R&D on marginal profits is
stronger (bigger in absolute value) than the cross effect (i.e. π¯i
∆i∆i
< π¯i
∆i∆j
)
we get
π¯i∆i∆i π¯
j
∆j∆j
− π¯i∆i∆j π¯
j
∆i∆j
> 0.
Note that using (1), (2), (4), (5), (10), (11) and the assumption that marginal
costs are constant with respect to output (so that q¯j
∆i∆j
= 0), gives us
πiij = q¯
j
∆i
(
Riij(x
i, xj)q¯i∆j +R
i
jj(x
i, xj)q¯j
∆j
)
−Cix∆q¯
i
∆j < 0. (16)
Thus, R&D expenditures are strategic substitutes and R&D reaction functions
are negatively sloped.
To understand (16), notice that firm i sets its R&D ∆i to satisfy (14).
An infinitesimal increase in ∆i increases profits for firm i since the total cost
of production is reduced. Further, the quantity produced by firm j in the
last stage also declines which, in turn, increases the revenues of firm i.11 This
increase in revenues has to be compared with the cost of increasing R&D
φii(∆
i).
Consider now an increase in R&D by firm j (∆j). An increase in R&D
by firm j increases its own quantity and reduces the quantity of firm i. The
most important effect is the reduction in xi (for linear demands the effect on xj
vanishes), since a lower output implies that own R&D (∆i) is less effective at
increasing profits. Since the marginal cost of R&D for firm 1 does not change,
this implies that the optimal level of R&D for firm 1 has to be lower after an
increase in ∆j . Hence
d∆i
d∆j
< 0.
10Note that even if we assume that marginal costs are constant with respect to output
and linear with respect to R&D, (i.e. q¯j
∆i∆i
= 0) we still need to ensure that Ci∆∆ + φ
i
ii is
big enough for (15) to hold. This implies that as R&D increases its cost-effectiveness has to
decline fast enough.
11Because of the envelope theorem, the effect of an infinitesimal change on firm i’s R&D
on profits through its effect on the quantity produced by firm i can be ignored
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Figure 1: Cournot competition: Effect of an output subsidy s imposed by
government 1.
2.3 Output subsidies
In order to see the effect of output subsidies on R&D investment, we totally
differentiate the two first order conditions for the R&D stage. The following
proposition states the effect of an output subsidy on the equilibrium R&D of
both firms.
Proposition 1 An output subsidy by the domestic government increases the
equilibrium level of R&D chosen by the domestic firm and reduces the R&D
level chosen by the foreign firm. That is,
d∆1
ds1
> 0
d∆2
ds1
< 0.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 states that an increase in the subsidy s1 shifts the reaction
function of both firms in R&D space. The reaction function of firm 1 shifts
outwards while the reaction function of firm 2 shifts inwards. This is illustrated
in the left half of figure 1. An output subsidy s1 moves the equilibrium in the
R&D space from point C (free trade) to point S. This implies that for a small
increment in its output subsidy, firm 1 will be inside its isoprofit contour (π1)
passing through the free trade equilibrium point C. This analysis, however,
does not take into account the effect of output subsidies in output space (i.e.
in the third stage). The effect in the output competition stage is illustrated
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on the right side of figure 1. Notice that an output subsidy s1, imposed by
government 1, increases domestic R&D and lowers foreign R&D (as seen in the
left half of figure 1). This reduces domestic marginal costs beyond the direct
effect of the subsidy and increases foreign marginal costs. In output space, this
means that the domestic output reaction function shifts out and the foreign
reaction function shifts in. The resulting equilibrium is at point S, which is
inside the isoprofit contour (π1) that passes through the free trade equilibrium
at point C. Therefore, an output subsidy increases welfare for the domestic
country both through R&D and output.
To obtain the optimal output subsidy these two effects need to be included.
The net benefit of government 1 is B¯1(s1) = π¯1(∆1,∆2, s1)− s1x1. Differenti-
ating B¯1(s1) with respect to s1 we obtain,
∂B¯1
∂s1
= π¯1∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ π¯1s1 − x
1 − s1
dq¯1
ds1
.
Recall that, π¯1
s1
= R12(x
1, x2)q¯2
s1
(∆1,∆2, s1) + x1 and π¯1∆1 = 0 from the R&D
stage. Further,
dq¯1
ds1
= q¯1∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ q¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ q¯1s1 > 0.
This last inequality simply states that the total effect of an output subsidy
on equilibrium output is positive, i.e. an output subsidy makes a firm in that
country more competitive in the output stage (q¯1
s1
> 0). Further, an output
subsidy reduces foreign R&D while increasing domestic R&D in the second
stage. This in turn benefits domestic production, i.e. q¯1∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ q¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
> 0.
Given this, ∂B¯
1
∂s1
simplifies to
∂B¯1
∂s1
= π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+R12q¯
2
s1 − s
1dq¯
1
ds1
= R12
(
q¯2∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ q¯2s1
)
− s1
dq¯1
ds1
. (17)
The first term reflects the effect of the output subsidy on domestic benefit in the
second (R&D) stage.12 The output subsidy reduces foreign R&D (∆2) resulting
in an increase in domestic profits. As a result, the effect of a subsidy s1 on
benefits in the second stage is positive. The second term captures what happens
in the third (output) stage: an increase in the subsidy s1 reduces the quantity
produced by the foreign firm resulting in an increase in domestic revenues (and
profits). The third term reflects the increased subsidy expenditure brought
about by an increased production for the domestic firm s1 dq¯
1
ds1
. The sign of the
expression ∂B¯
1
∂s1
is determined by the net of the three effects pointed out above.
12Since firm 1 is choosing R&D, ∆1, to maximize profits then an infinitesimal output
subsidy s1will not affect benefits.
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Notice that, starting from a subsidy s1 equal to zero, an infinitesimal increase
in the output subsidy increases domestic benefit for the subsidizing country as
both the output effect
(
q¯2
s1
)
and the R&D effect
(
q¯2∆2
d∆2
ds1
)
move in the same
direction.
∂B¯1
∂s1
∣∣∣∣
s1=0
= π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+R12q¯
2
s1 > 0
To obtain the precise expression for the optimal output subsidy we set ∂B¯
1
∂s1
= 0:
Proposition 2 When firms compete à la Cournot, the optimal output subsidy
s1∗ is positive:
s1∗ =
π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+R12q¯
2
s1
dq¯1
ds1
=
R12
(
q¯2∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ q¯2
s1
)
q¯1
∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ q¯1
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ q¯1
s1
> 0
Proof. Immediate from (17)
This proposition extends the results in Spencer and Brander (1983). They
analyze the case when an output subsidy is set after firms invest in R&D
and before they choose output. They find that the optimal output subsidy is
positive. They also analyze the case of subsidies to R&D and output before
the R&D stage, finding that output subsidies are also positive. Here we have
shown that output subsidies are also positive under Cournot competition if
subsidies are set before R&D investment.
Note that the separation into two effects related to each of the two stages
in which firms play will be useful to characterize the solution in the case of
Bertrand competition.
3 Bertrand Competition
Consider again a three—stage game. In stage 1, government 1 imposes an output
subsidy s1. In the second stage, firms simultaneously choose R&D. In the last
stage, firms compete in prices. We assume that goods are imperfect substitutes
and that the own-price effect dominates the cross-price effect,
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
< 0 <
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pj∣∣∣∣∂xi(pi, pj)∂pi
∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∂xi(pi, pj)∂pj
∣∣∣∣ . (18)
Using previous notation, revenues and costs can be written as, Rˆi(pi, pj) =
xi(pi, pj) · pi = Ri(xi(pi, pj), xj(pi, pj)) and Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i) = Ci(xi(pi, pj),∆i),
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respectively. Revenues are assumed to satisfy the following properties:
Rˆiii(p
i, pj) = pi
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂ (pi)2
+ 2
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
< 0 (19)
Rˆijj(p
i, pj) = pi
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂ (pj)2
≥ 0 (20)
Rˆiij(p
i, pj) = pi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi∂pj
+
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pj
> 0 (21)
Assumption (19) states that revenue is concave in its own price, a property
which is satisfied by demand functions that are not too convex. Assumption
(20) is the standard case where revenue is increasing, at a non-decreasing rate,
in the other firm’s price. This property, in particular, is satisfied by linear
demand functions. Lastly, (21) states that an increase in the price of one good
increases marginal revenue for the other firm. This is again satisfied in the
case of linear demand.
We make the following assumptions about costs (which are equivalent to
(1) and (2) in the Cournot case):
Cˆi∆ =
∂Cˆi(pi, pj,∆i)
∂∆i
≤ 0, Cˆi∆∆ =
∂2Cˆi(pi, pj,∆i)
∂ (∆i)2
≥ 0,
Cˆipi∆ =
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
> 0, (22)
Cˆipj∆ =
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pj
< 0
φii(∆
i) > 0, φiii(∆
i) > 0
Cˆipi =
∂Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)
∂pi
=
∂Ci(xi,∆i)
∂xi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
< 0
Cˆipipi =
∂2Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)
(∂pi)2
=
∂Ci(xi,∆i)
∂xi
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂ (pi)2
+
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂ (xi)2
(
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
)2
≥ 0
Cˆipipj =
∂2Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)
∂pi∂pj
(23)
=
∂Ci(xi,∆i)
∂xi
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂pi∂pj
+
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂ (xi)2
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pj
≤ 0.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA      19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0701 
The profit function of firm 1 and firm 2 can now be written as:
Π¯1(p1, p2,∆1, s1) = Rˆ1(p1, p2)− Cˆ1(p1, p2,∆1)− φ(∆1) + s1 · x1(p1, p2)
= Π1(p1, p2,∆1) + s1 · x1(p1, p2)
Π¯2(p1, p2,∆2) = Π2(p1, p2,∆2) = Rˆ2(p1, p2)− Cˆ2(p1, p2,∆2)− φ(∆2).
The net domestic benefit of country 1 is simply the profit of the domestic firm
minus the cost of the subsidy:
B¯1(s1) = Π¯1(p1, p2,∆1, s1)− s1 · x1(p1, p2) = Π1(p1, p2,∆1).
3.1 Last Stage: Price Competition
In the first stage, firms maximize Π¯1(p1, p2,∆1, s1) and Π¯2(p1, p2,∆2) choosing
the price p1 and p2, respectively. The first order conditions to this problem
are:
Π¯11 = Rˆ
1
1(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p1(p
1, p2,∆1) + s1
∂x1
∂p1
= 0 (24)
Π¯22 = Rˆ
2
2(p
1, p2)− Cˆ2p2(p
1, p2,∆2) = 0 (25)
with the second order conditions:13
Π¯111 = Rˆ
1
11(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p1p1(p
1, pj,∆1) + s1
∂2x1
∂ (p1)2
< 0 (26)
Π¯222 = Rˆ
2
22(p
1, p2)− Cˆ2p2p2(p
1, p2,∆2) < 0
We assume that the second order conditions are satisfied.
For later use we need to assume that the own effect of output on marginal
profits is stronger (bigger in absolute value) than the cross effect, that is
∣∣Π¯iii∣∣ >∣∣∣Π¯iij∣∣∣ . This implies that
Π¯111Π¯
2
22 − Π¯
1
12Π¯
2
12 > 0
Note that assumptions (21) and (23) imply that the cross-partial derivative
of profits is positive (Π¯iij > 0) for country 2. That is also the case for country
1 as long as ∂x
i(pi,pj)
∂pi∂pj
is not too big, which we assume. In that case, prices are
13Note that, for linear demands, Π¯iii = Π
i
ii and Π¯
i
ij = Π
i
ij are the same as in the case of
free trade since ∂
2x1
∂(p1)2
= 0.
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strategic complements and price reaction functions are positively sloped. That
is, along a price reaction function,
dpi
dpj
= −
Π¯iij
Π¯iii
> 0 (27)
This is a standard result for Bertrand games with differentiated products.
The solution to the two equations (24) and (25) gives us prices as a function
of the R&D levels of both firms (chosen in the previous stage) and output
subsidy s1,
pi = ψ¯
i
(∆i,∆j, s1)
To see the effect of R&D investment and subsidies on prices, we differentiate
the two first order conditions given in (24) and (25). We obtain
ψ¯
i
∆i(∆
i,∆j, s1) =
dpi
d∆i
=
Π¯jjjCˆ
i
pi∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
< 0 (28)
ψ¯
i
∆j (∆
i,∆j, s1) =
dpi
d∆j
=
−Π¯iijCˆ
j
pj∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
< 0 (29)
where the inequalities come from (21), (22), (23) and (26). The expressions
above state that prices are decreasing both in domestic and foreign R&D. An
increase in R&D expenditure reduces the marginal cost of production shift-
ing the reaction curve of firm i downwards. Given that prices are strategic
complements, this implies that both firm i and firm j charge a lower price.
Given that the output subsidy is chosen before firms decide on their R&D,
the effect of the subsidy on prices has to take into account how it affects the
choice of R&D by both firms. The partial effects, keeping R&D levels (∆1 and
∆2) constant, are:
ψ¯
1
s1(∆
1,∆2, s1)
∣∣∣
∆1,∆2 constant
=
−Π¯222
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π¯111Π¯
2
22 − Π¯
2
12Π¯
1
12
< 0 (30)
ψ¯
2
s1(∆
1,∆2, s1)
∣∣∣
∆1,∆2 constant
=
Π¯212
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π¯111Π¯
2
22 − Π¯
2
12Π¯
1
12
< 0. (31)
Notice that we assume that R&D levels are kept constant, while in fact they
are influenced by the choice of output subsidies. The total effect of a change
in s1, therefore, has to also take this into account.14
In order to obtain the effect of imposing an output subsidy (before R&D
takes place), we turn now to the R&D stage.
14Expressions for ψ¯
1
s1 and ψ¯
2
s1 (in (30) and (31)) would be relevant if output subsidies are
chosen after R&D levels are set.
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3.2 R&D investment
Rewrite the profit of the firm as a function of R&D and output subsidies:
π¯i(∆i,∆j, s1) = Π¯i(ψ¯
i
(∆i,∆j , s
1), ψ¯
j
(∆i,∆j, s
1),∆i, s1)
= Rˆi(ψ¯
i
, ψ¯
j
)− Cˆi(ψ¯
i
, ψ¯
j
,∆i)− φi(∆i) + s1 · xi(ψ¯
i
, ψ¯
j
)
The first order conditions for a Nash equilibrium in the choice of R&D are,
π¯1∆1(∆
1,∆2, s1) =
[
Rˆ12(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p2(p
1, p2,∆1) + s1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)]
×
ψ2∆1(∆
1,∆2, s1)− Cˆ1∆(p
1, p2,∆1)− φ11(∆
1) (32)
= 0
π¯2∆2(∆
1,∆2, s1) =
[
Rˆ21(p
1, p2)− Cˆ2p1(p
1, p2,∆2)
]
ψ1∆2(∆
2,∆1, s1)
−Cˆ2∆(p
1, p2,∆2)− φ21(∆
2) (33)
= 0.
With the second order conditions:15
π¯1∆1∆1 =
(
Rˆ12 − Cˆ
1
p2 + s
1
(
∂x2
∂p1
))
ψ¯
2
∆1∆1
+ψ¯
2
∆1

dRˆ12(p2, p1)
d∆1
−
dCˆ1
p2
(p2, p1,∆1)
d∆1
+ s1
d
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
d∆1


−Cˆ1p1∆ψ¯
1
∆1 − Cˆ
1
p2∆ψ¯
2
∆1 − Cˆ
1
∆∆ − φ
1
11 < 0 (34)
15Notice that
dRˆij(p
i,pj)
d∆i
= Rˆiij(p
i, pj)ψ¯
i
∆i + Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψ¯
j
∆i < 0 (by (20), (21), (28) and
(29)) and
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj ,∆i)
d∆i
= Cˆipipj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
i
∆i + Cˆ
i
pjpj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
j
∆i + Cˆ
i
pj∆(p
i, pj ,∆i). In
general,
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj ,∆i)
d∆i
is hard to sign. However, in the case of linear demand it is equal
to Cˆipj∆(p
i, pj ,∆i), which is negative. For the case of linear demand we also have that
d
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
d∆1
= 0. Assuming also that marginal costs are constant with respect to output and
linear with respect to R&D (i.e. ψ¯
j
∆i∆i = 0), we get π¯
i
∆i∆i(∆
i,∆j , s1) = ψ¯
j
∆i
dRˆij(p
i,pj)
d∆i
−
Cˆipi∆ψ¯
i
∆i − 2Cˆ
i
pj∆ψ¯
j
∆i − Cˆ
i
∆∆ − φ
i
ii. This expression can only be negative (for (34) to hold)
if 2Cˆipj∆ψ¯
j
∆i + Cˆ
i
∆∆ + φ
i
ii is big enough. This is equivalent to saying that as R&D increases,
its cost-effectiveness has to decline fast enough, a condition similar to the Cournot case.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA        22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0701 
π¯2∆2∆2 =
(
Rˆ21 − Cˆ
2
p1
)
ψ¯
1
∆2∆2 + ψ¯
1
∆2
(
dRˆ21(p
1, p2)
d∆2
−
dCˆ2
p1
(p1, p2,∆2)
d∆2
)
−Cˆ2p2∆ψ¯
2
∆2 − Cˆ
2
p1∆ψ¯
1
∆2 − Cˆ
2
∆∆ − φ
2
11
< 0
We assume that the own effect of R&D on marginal profits is stronger
(bigger in absolute value) than the cross effect, that is, π¯i
∆i∆i
< π¯i
∆i∆j
. This
implies that,
π¯1∆1∆1 π¯
2
∆2∆2 − π¯
1
∆1∆2 π¯
2
∆1∆2 > 0 (35)
The cross partial derivative π¯i
∆i∆j
is, in general, difficult to sign. However,
for the usual case of linear demand and constant marginal costs, the following
proposition establishes that R&D expenditures are strategic substitutes even
if firms compete in prices.
Proposition 3 Under Bertrand competition, R&D expenditures are strategic
substitutes for the case of linear demand and constant marginal costs:
π¯i∆i∆j = ψ¯
j
∆iψ¯
i
∆j Rˆ
i
ij(p
i, pj)− Cˆipi∆ψ¯
i
∆j − Cˆ
i
pj∆ψ¯
j
∆j < 0 (36)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that an increase in R&D by firm 2 reduces the marginal
profitability of R&D by firm 1. To see how this occurs, notice that firm 1 sets
its R&D, ∆1, to satisfy (32). An infinitesimal increase in ∆1 has two opposing
effects on firm 1’s profits. First, profits increase due to the reduction in total
costs Cˆ1. On the other hand the decrease in p2 (due to increased R&D, ∆1)
decreases firm revenues.16 The first order condition (32) shows this trade off
against the increase in the cost of R&D , φ11(∆
1).
Consider now an infinitesimal increase in R&D by firm 2. This reduces
both p1 and p2. However, the fall in own price (p2) is greater than the price
decline for the rival.17 A bigger price increase for firm 1 means that it now sells
less. Lower output reduces the effectiveness of ∆1 in reducing total costs for
firm 1. This is captured by the last two terms of (36). The first term captures
the effect of an increase in ∆2 on the marginal effect of ∆1 on firm 1’s revenue.
The fall in quantity (x1), associated with an increase in ∆2, makes the revenue
loss of an increase in ∆1 less important. This accounts for ψ¯
j
∆iψ¯
i
∆j Rˆ
i
ij(p
i, pj)
being positive.
16From the envelope theorem we can ignore the effect on firm 1’s price on its profits.
17This can be easily seen comparing ψ¯
i
∆i and ψ¯
i
∆j on (28) and (29), and recalling that own
effects dominate cross effects in the price stage.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA      23 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0701 
Note that the (direct) effect on costs dominates the (indirect) effect on
revenue (as shown in the proof of proposition 3). The positive effect of investing
in R&D for firm 1 weakens due to an increase in ∆2. Since the marginal cost
of R&D φ11(∆
1) is unaffected by a change in ∆2, an increase in foreign R&D
(∆2) makes own R&D less attractive. Therefore, firm 1 optimally invests less
in R&D in response to an increase in ∆1, implying that π¯i
∆i∆j
< 0.
A corollary of the previous proposition is that the slope of firm i’s R&D
reaction function is negative. Note that R&D reaction functions are negatively
sloped (i.e. strategic substitutes) both under Cournot and Bertrand competi-
tion because the main effect of R&D comes through total costs. In both cases
an increase in R&D by firm 2 reduces firm 1’s output thereby decreasing the
capacity of ∆1 to reduce firm 1’s total costs. Under Cournot competition, the
effect on marginal revenue adds to this effect on costs. With Bertrand com-
petition, the effect on marginal revenue dampens (but does not dominate) the
effect on costs (as shown in proposition 3).
The next section describes the effect of output subsidies on R&D and price
choices, under Bertrand competition.
3.3 Output Subsidies
In order to see the effect of output subsidies on R&D investment, we totally dif-
ferentiate the two first order conditions given by (32) and (33). Unfortunately,
no clear-cut solutions exist when we depart from the case of linear demand
and constant marginal costs. However, as this is the standard case analyzed
in much of the literature on the subject, we concentrate our analysis of output
subsidies on this scenario.
The next proposition describes the effect of an output subsidy on the equi-
librium R&D chosen by firms.
Proposition 4 Under Bertrand competition, an output subsidy by the domes-
tic government increases R&D of the domestic firm, and reduces R&D of the
foreign firm:
d∆1
ds1
> 0
d∆2
ds1
< 0.
Proof. See appendix
The intuition for this proposition is straightforward once we consider how
R&D influences profits. Recall (from the discussion of proposition 3) that the
incentives to invest in R&D decrease if output declines: the beneficial effects
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Figure 2: Bertrand Competition: Effect of an output subsidy s imposed by
government 1.
of cost reduction are smaller if output is lower. Consider now an increase
in the output subsidy s1. The output subsidy results in a reduction in the
price of both goods. However, p1 declines by a greater amount than p2. As a
result, output of firm 1 increases while output of firm 2 decreases. The output
expansion creates an even greater incentive for firm 1 to invest in R&D (shifts
its R&D reaction function out). The effect on firm 2 is just the contrary: the
incentives for firm 2 to invest in R&D decline (firm 2’s R&D reaction function
shifts in) due to the output subsidy, s1.
This is the same type of effect as was observed under Cournot competi-
tion. An increase in the output subsidy increases quantity produced thereby
positively affecting the incentives to invest in R&D for the home firm. In both
cases the foreign firm reduces its R&D due to decreased foreign production.
As one would expect, an output subsidy imposed by the domestic government
affects domestic R&D more than foreign R&D. This result, formalized in the
next corollary, is used later to determine the sign of the optimal output subsidy.
Corollary 5 Under Bertrand competition, the effect of an output subsidy on
own R&D expenditures is stronger than on foreign R&D expenditures:∣∣∣∣d∆1ds1
∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣d∆2ds1
∣∣∣∣
Proof. See appendix
We can conduct a graphical analysis similar to the Cournot case. As with
quantity competition, an increase in output subsidy (s1) shifts the R&D re-
action function of firm 1 out and that of firm 2 in (left half of figure 2) This
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means that the equilibrium in R&D space moves from B (free trade) to S.
For a small output subsidy, this leaves firm 1 inside its isoprofit contour (π1)
that passes through the free trade point B : just looking at the R&D stage
an output subsidy increases welfare for the domestic country. However, as in
the Cournot case, we have to also take into account the effect of the subsidy
in the price competition stage. This is illustrated in the right half of figure 2.
As in the case of Cournot competition, an output subsidy increases domestic
and reduces foreign R&D, reducing domestic marginal costs beyond the direct
effect of the subsidy and increasing foreign marginal costs. This means that
the domestic price reaction function shifts in and the foreign price reaction
function shifts out, moving the equilibrium from B to S. From corollary 5 we
know that even if we only take into account the effect of R&D on the price
stage, the reaction function of firm 1 will shift more that the reaction function
of firm 2. This leaves point S outside the isoprofit contour π1 passing through
point B in the price space. Therefore an output subsidy reduces welfare for
the home government in the price stage. The net effect on the two stages
determines whether an output subsidy increases or reduces welfare.
Formally, define the net domestic benefit of government 1 as B¯1(s1) =
π¯1(∆1,∆2, s1)− s1x1(ψ¯
1
, ψ¯
2
). Taking the derivative of B¯1(s1) with respect to
s1:
∂B¯1
∂s1
= π¯1∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ π¯1s1 − x
1 − s1
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
− s1
∂x1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
which can be rewritten as (see appendix):
∂B¯1
∂s1
= m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
s1−s
1
[
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
+
∂x1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
]
(37)
where m1 ≡ p1 − ∂C
1
∂x1
+ s1 > 0 is the gross benefit per unit sold, including
the output subsidy. Note that the terms dψ¯
i
ds1
capture the total effect of the
output subsidy on prices. They take into account that the subsidy also affects
the choice of R&D by both firms in the second stage (and these, in turn, affect
prices).
The first term on the right hand side of (37) shows the effect of the output
subsidy on domestic benefit in the second stage (R&D investment). A domestic
output subsidy reduces foreign R&D investment
(
d∆2
ds1
< 0
)
, which in turn
increases the foreign price p2. The increase in p2 increases domestic output x1
and hence firm 1’s profits. Notice that due to the envelope theorem, the effect
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of an infinitesimal increase in the subsidy s1 on domestic benefit B¯1 (through
domestic R&D) can be ignored.
The second term in (37) captures the effect of an output subsidy on do-
mestic benefit in the third stage (price competition stage). A domestic output
subsidy reduces the foreign price in the price competition stage (ψ¯
2
s1 < 0). The
reduction in the foreign price p2 reduces domestic output and profits. Again
the envelope theorem allows us to ignore the effect of the output subsidy on
domestic benefits through the domestic price p1.
Notice that, starting from a subsidy s1 equal to zero, an infinitesimal in-
crease in the subsidy increases domestic benefits if and only if the R&D stage
effect
(
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
)
is stronger than the price stage effect,
(
ψ¯
2
s1
)
.
∂B¯1
∂s1
∣∣∣∣
s1=0
=
[
p1 −
∂C1
∂x1
](
∂x1
∂p2
)(
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1
)
The third term in (37) captures the increase in the subsidy bill brought
about by an increase in domestic output. It includes the direct effect of the
subsidy in the price competition stage as well as the R&D stage effect and
price stage effect. To obtain the expression for the optimal output subsidy we
need to solve
∂B¯1
∂s1
= 0 (38)
with the second order condition
∂2B¯1
(∂s1)2
< 0. (39)
Solving (38), the precise expression for the optimal output subsidy is obtained:
s1∗ = m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
+ ∂x
1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
(40)
where m1 = p1 − ∂C
1
∂x1
+ s1∗ as before. The denominator in (40) is positive,18
and thus the sign of the optimal subsidy depends on whether the effect on the
R&D stage or on the price stage dominates in the numerator of (40). Define
θ = −
Cˆi
pi∆
∂xi
∂pi
= −∂
2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi
as the effectiveness of R&D at reducing marginal
costs of production. As we will see, the sign of the optimal output subsidy is
ambiguous and depends on the cost of R&D (φ111) relative to the effectiveness
18See the proof of proposition 7.
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of R&D (θ). Notice from (28) that ψ¯
i
∆i is independent of φ
1
11. Therefore,
d∆2
ds1
is the only term in the numerator of (40) that depends on φ111. The following
lemma helps to understand the role of the cost of R&D on the elasticity of
R&D to output subsidies.
Lemma 6 The influence of output subsidies on R&D decreases as the marginal
cost of R&D increases. Specifically,
∂
∣∣∣d∆1
ds1
∣∣∣
∂φ111
< 0
∂
∣∣∣d∆2
ds1
∣∣∣
∂φ111
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix
An increase in φ111 makes R&D investment more convex. As a result, R&D
is less elastic to an output subsidy, and therefore the R&D stage effect of an
output subsidy in (40) is weaker. Whenever the R&D stage effect is weak, the
optimal output subsidy is influenced more by the price stage effect and should
be optimally set below zero (an output tax).
The domestic government only takes into account the effect of an output
subsidy on price competition when the effect of an output subsidy on foreign
R&D is smaller (φ111 becomes higher). Contrarily, the government only takes
into account the effect of the output subsidy on the R&D stage when φ111 is
small enough. The following proposition formalizes this result, showing that
we could have an output subsidy or a tax depending on the convexity of the
cost of investment in R&D, i.e. φi11.
19
Proposition 7 Under Bertrand competition, the optimal output subsidy s1∗
can be positive or negative, depending on the convexity of the cost of R&D
(φi11). The optimal output subsidy is positive (an output subsidy) when the cost
of additional investment in R&D is sufficiently low (low φi11), and negative (an
output tax) when φi11 is sufficiently high. Specifically,
∃φ¯ <∞ such that if φi11 > φ¯ then s
1∗ < 0
∃φ > θπ¯1∆1s1 − π
i
∆i∆j such that if φ
i
11 < φ then s
1∗ > 0.
19Notice, however, that φi
11
is bounded below by the stability condition (35) and therefore
cannot take values below θπ¯1
∆1s1 − π
i
∆i∆j
. See the proof of lemma 6.
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Figure 3: Cournot: Optimal output subsidy
(
s1∗
)
as a function of the cost-
effectiveness of R&D
(
η = θ
2
bφ
)
.
(for a− c = 1, γ = 0.5)
Proof. See Appendix
As φi
11
increases, the cost of investing in R&D becomes more convex. A
steeper R&D cost function makes R&D less elastic with respect to an output
subsidy. This reduces the effect of the subsidy on the foreign firm’s R&D
reaction function, leaving the effect on the foreign firm price reaction function
unaffected. This implies that the domestic government has an incentive to
reduce the output subsidy, or even tax output, as in the standard Bertrand
game without R&D investment.
The following section performs a numerical exercise to highlight the results
of price and quantity competition.
4 A Numerical Example
In this example,20 we consider linear demands and constant marginal costs
with respect to output. In particular, assume that the inverse demand for
good i is given by:
pi = a− b(xi + γxj).
With 0 < γ < 1. Cost functions are linear in output,
C(xi,∆i) =
(
c− θ∆i
)
xi
20The mathematica code used to generate the numerical results is available from the authors
upon request.
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Figure 4: Bertrand: Optimal output subsidy
(
s1∗
)
as a function of the cost-
effectiveness of R&D
(
η = θ
2
bφ
)
.
(for a− c = 1, γ = 0.5)
and the monetary cost of ∆i units of R&D is quadratic:
φ(∆i) = φ
(
∆i
)2
2
.
The optimal output subsidy is always positive under Cournot competition,
as both the R&D stage effect (q¯2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
) and the price stage effect (q¯2
s1
) have the
same sign (see proposition 2). R&D becomes more elastic with respect to the
output subsidy as the cost of R&D becomes flatter (i.e. φi11 falls). In this case
the government has greater incentives to subsidize output thereby reducing
foreign R&D. Figure 3 shows the optimal subsidy as a function of the cost-
effectiveness of R&D (defined as η = θ
2
φb
). The optimal subsidy is increasing in
η.
The case of Bertrand competition is slightly more complicated. We have
to satisfy (39), the second order condition of the government maximization
problem. As we expected, the optimal subsidy also depends on the cost—
effectiveness of R&D (η). Figure 4 shows the optimal output subsidy, which
is increasing in η (decreasing in φi11). Note that as the R&D effect becomes
stronger (η increases) the government reverses its policy from an output tax to
an output subsidy.21 Note also that, interestingly, there is a set of parameter
values for which free trade (s1∗ = 0) is an equilibrium in the Bertrand case,
even in the presence of imperfect competition.
21For the Bertrand example in this section, (figure 4), the stability condition (35) translates
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Tables 1 and 2 present numerical results for γ = 0.3 and two different
values of η (0.3 and 0.7). Notice that all relevant quantities are positive and
that the second order condition for the government’s maximization problem is
satisfied. Table 2 shows that, depending on the cost-effectiveness of R&D (η),
there could be a policy reversal under Bertrand competition.22
5 Conclusions
This paper shows that for sufficiently cost effective R&D the trade policy re-
versal in Eaton and Grossman (1986) is not observed. Our result suggests that
output subsidies are more robust than otherwise implied by the literature on
strategic trade. If exporting industries make long run investments before com-
peting in the market then governments have a case for using output subsidies
even if they are uncertain about the mode of competition in the market.
We show that a necessary condition for output subsidies to be robust is
that R&D be sufficiently cost effective. If the cost of R&D is too convex then
R&D expenditures will be relatively inelastic to the export subsidy. In this
case, the effect of an export subsidy on R&D will be negligible and will thus
be arbitrarily close to the case when there is no R&D investment (Brander and
Spencer (1985), Eaton and Grossman (1986)). If R&D costs are not too convex
then R&D is responsive to an output subsidy. In this case, the effect of the
output subsidy on the R&D stage reinforces the effect of the output subsidy
on the market competition stage under Cournot competition, and dominates
into
η <
(
1− γ2
)
(4− γ2)2
2 (2− γ2) (2 + γ − γ2)
For the value in the numerical example (γ = 0.5), we require η < 1.33929 to satisfy that
condition.
22The numerical simulations presented in section 3 of Neary and Leahy (2000) assume, for
the Cournot case, a set of parameters, which with our notation, imply b = γ = θ = a− c = 1
and η = 1
φ
= 0.2. For that set of parameters we obtain an optimal subsidy s1∗ = 0.3089,
which roughly corresponds to what they refer to as the second—best optimal output subsidy.
This is represented by the intersection of the flatter line with the vertical axis in their figure
3.
For the Bertrand simulation, they use a set of parameters b = θ = a−c = 1 and η = 1φ = 0.4,
with inverse demands
x
i = a− b(pi − pj)
which means that cross price effects are as strong as own price effects. Therefore we cannot
compare directly with their results. They find that the optimal output subsidy is negative
(point C in their figure 4). If we set γ = 0.5 with their other parameters, in our simulation
we obtain a negative output subsidy (i.e. a tax) equal to s1∗ = −0.0224. We only need to
have a cost—effectiveness of R&D beyond 0.6 to obtain a positive output subsidy, as shown
in figure 4.
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Cournot Competition: numerical simulation
Product
differentiation
γ 0.5 0.5
Cost-effectiveness
of R&D
η = θ
2
φb
0.3 0.7
Price firm 1 p1
0.2765a
+0.7235c
0.0689a
+0.9311c
Price firm 2 p2
0.3035a
+0.6965c
0.1349a
+0.8651c
Output firm 1 x1 0.5004
(
a−c
b
)
0.6648
(
a−c
b
)
Output firm 2 x2 0.4463
(
a−c
b
)
0.5328
(
a−c
b
)
R&D firm 1 ∆1 0.1601
(
a−c
θ
)
0.4964
(
a−c
θ
)
R&D firm 2 ∆2 0.1428
(
a−c
θ
)
0.3977
(
a−c
θ
)
Unit profit firm 1
m1 =
p1 − c+ s1
0.3403 (a− c) 0.1684 (a− c)
Unit profit firm 2 m2 = p2 − c 0.3035 (a− c) 0.1349 (a− c)
Total profits firm 1 π1 0.2076 (a−c)
2
b
0.2659 (a−c)
2
b
Total profits firm 2 π2 0.1652 (a−c)
2
b
0.1707 (a−c)
2
b
Benefits country 1 B1 0.1757 (a−c)
2
b
0.1998 (a−c)
2
b
Benefits country 2 B2 0.1652 (a−c)
2
b
0.1707 (a−c)
2
b
Optimal
output subsidy
s1∗ 0.0638 (a− c) 0.0995 (a− c)
Government’s SOC ∂
2B1
(∂s1∗)2
−0.5987
b
−0.8141
b
Table 1: Numerical simulation under Cournot Competition in the third stage
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Bertrand Competition: numerical simulations
Product
differentiation
γ 0.5 0.5
Cost-effectiveness
of R&D
η = θ
2
φb
0.3 0.7
Price firm 1 p1
0.2575a
+0.7425c
0.0483a
+0.9517c
Price firm 2 p2
0.2422a
+0.7578c
0.0598a
+0.9401c
Output firm 1 x1 0.4848
(
a−c
b
)
0.6422
(
a−c
b
)
Output firm 2 x2 0.5154
(
a−c
b
)
0.6191
(
a−c
b
)
R&D firm 1 ∆1 0.1357
(
a−c
θ
)
0.4196
(
a−c
θ
)
R&D firm 2 ∆2 0.1443
(
a−c
θ
)
0.4044
(
a−c
θ
)
Unit profit firm 1
m1 =
p1 − c+ s1
0.2278 (a− c) 0.0621 (a− c)
Unit profit firm 2 m2 = p2 − c 0.2422 (a− c) 0.0598 (a− c)
Total profits firm 1 π1 0.1455 (a−c)
2
b
0.1836 (a−c)
2
b
Total profits firm 2 π2 0.1645 (a−c)
2
b
0.1706 (a−c)
2
b
Benefits country 1 B1 0.1599 (a−c)
2
b
0.1747 (a−c)
2
b
Benefits country 2 B2 0.1645 (a−c)
2
b
0.1706 (a−c)
2
b
Optimal
output subsidy
s1∗ −0.0297 (a− c) 0.0138 (a− c)
Government’s SOC ∂
2B1
(∂s1∗)2
−0.8055
b
−1.1226
b
Table 2: Numerical simulation under Bertrand Competition in the third stage
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it under Bertrand competition. Thus, regardless of the mode of competition,
the optimal policy is an output subsidy if R&D is sufficiently cost-effective.
Our condition on the curvature of the cost of R&D is reminiscent of Maggi
(1996). In his model, firms invest in capacity and then compete in prices
in the product market. Maggi shows that going from Cournot to Bertrand
competition the optimal policy changes from an output subsidy to a tax. The
key parameter is his model is the convexity of the cost function. A more convex
cost function (i.e. steeper marginal cost) results in firm behavior closer to price
competition. The optimal trade policy in this case is an output tax. Contrarily,
a flatter marginal cost implies that the optimal policy is an output subsidy.
In contrast to Maggi (1996), in our model marginal costs are constant. Under
Bertrand competition, whether the optimal policy is an output subsidy or a
tax, depends on the convexity of the cost of R&D . Under Cournot competition,
the optimal trade policy is always an output subsidy.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiate totally the two first order conditions given by (14) to get:
d∆i
ds1
=
−π¯
j
∆j∆j
π¯i
∆is1
+ π¯i
∆i∆j
π¯
j
∆js1
π¯i
∆i∆i
π¯
j
∆j∆j
− π¯i
∆i∆j
π¯
j
∆i∆j
(41)
In order to obtain the value of the expressions in (41) we first need to sign
the total effect of subsidies on marginal revenues (including the effect on the
last stage (quantity competition). We therefore have
dR12(x
1, x2)
ds1
= R112(x
1, x2)q¯1s1 +R
1
22(x
1, x2)q¯2s1 < 0 (42)
dR21(x
1, x2)
ds1
= R211(x
1, x2)q¯1s1 +R
2
12(x
1, x2)q¯2s1 > 0 (43)
by (4), (5), (12) and (13). Using these signs we can now turn to the elements
in (41)
π¯i∆i∆i = R
i
j q¯
j
∆i∆i
+ q¯j
∆i
dRij(x
i, xj)
d∆i
−Cix∆q¯
i
∆i −C
i
∆∆ − φ
i
ii < 0
π¯i∆i∆j = R
i
j q¯
j
∆i∆j
+ q¯j
∆i
dRij(x
i, xj)
d∆j
−Cix∆q¯
i
∆j < 0
π¯1∆1s1 = R
1
2q¯
2
∆1s1 + q¯
2
∆1
dR12(x
1, x2)
ds1
−C1x∆q¯
1
s1 > 0
π¯2∆2s1 = R
2
1q¯
1
∆2s1 + q¯
1
∆2
dR21(x
1, x2)
ds1
−C2x∆q¯
2
s1 < 0
where the first inequality is the second order condition of the maximization in
the R&D stage, the second inequality repeats (16), and the last two inequalities
are derived from (11), (12), (13), (42), (43), and noting that for linear demand
and constant marginal costs, q¯i
∆j
is independent of s1. Therefore
d∆1
ds1
=
−π¯2∆2∆2 π¯
1
∆1s1 + π¯
1
∆1∆2 π¯
2
∆2s1
π¯1
∆1∆1
π¯2
∆2∆2
− π¯1
∆1∆2
π¯2
∆1∆2
> 0
d∆2
ds1
=
−π¯1∆1∆1 π¯
2
∆2s1 + π¯
2
∆2∆1 π¯
1
∆1s1
π¯2
∆2∆2
π¯1
∆1∆1
− π¯2
∆2∆1
π¯1
∆2∆1
< 0
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B Proof of Proposition 3.
Note that,
π¯1∆1∆2 =
(
Rˆ12 − Cˆ
1
p2 + s
1
(
∂x1
∂p2
))
ψ¯
2
∆1∆2
+ψ¯
2
∆1

dRˆ12(p1, p2)
d∆2
−
dCˆ1
p2
(p1, p2,∆1)
d∆2
+ s1
d
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
d∆2


−Cˆ1p1∆ψ¯
1
∆2 − Cˆ
1
p2∆ψ¯
2
∆2
π¯2∆2∆1 =
(
Rˆ21 − Cˆ
2
p1
)
ψ¯
1
∆2∆1 + ψ¯
1
∆2
(
dRˆ21(p
1, p2)
d∆1
−
dCˆ2
p1
(p1, p2,∆2)
d∆1
)
−Cˆ2p2∆ψ¯
2
∆1 − Cˆ
2
p1∆ψ¯
1
∆1
Here,
dRˆij(p
i,pj)
d∆j
= Rˆiij(p
i, pj)ψ¯
i
∆j + Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψ¯
j
∆j < 0 (from (20), (21), (28)
and (29)) and
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj ,∆i)
d∆j
= Cˆi
pipj
(pi, pj,∆i)ψ¯
i
∆j + Cˆ
i
pjpj
(pi, pj,∆i)ψ¯
j
∆j . Both
the second order condition (34) and the stability condition (35) impose bounds
on φiii (this is discussed in the determination of the optimal subsidy).
Note that, under the assumption that marginal costs are constant, we have
ψ¯
j
∆i∆j = 0. If demand is linear then Rˆ
i
jj = 0 and the slope of the demand
function is not influenced by R&D. Formally:
d
(
∂xi
∂pi
)
d∆j
=
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂ (pi)2
ψ¯
i
∆j +
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂pi∂pj
ψ¯
j
∆j = 0 (44)
Both linearity of demand and constant marginal costs together imply Cˆi
pipj
=
Cˆi
pjpj
=
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj ,∆i)
d∆j
= 0.
Then, we can simplify both expressions π¯i
∆i∆j
to:
π¯i∆i∆j = ψ¯
j
∆iψ¯
i
∆j Rˆ
i
ij(p
i, pj)− Cˆipi∆ψ¯
i
∆j − Cˆ
i
pj∆ψ¯
j
∆j
=
−Π¯jijCˆ
i
pi∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
−Π¯iijCˆ
j
pj∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
Rˆiij − Cˆ
i
pi∆
−Π¯iijCˆ
j
pj∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
−Cˆipj∆
Π¯iiiCˆ
j
pj∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
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=
 1(
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
)2

× [Π¯jijCˆipi∆Π¯iijCˆjpj∆Rˆiij
+Cˆipi∆Π¯
i
ijCˆ
j
pj∆
(
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
)
−Cˆipj∆Π
i
iiCˆ
j
pj∆
(
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
)]
Recall that, for linear demands, Π¯iij = Rˆ
i
ij . Notice also that in the case of
linear demands, Π¯i is quadratic and all second derivatives of Π¯i(p1, p2) with
respect to prices are thus constant. Therefore, Π¯iii = Π¯
j
jj and Π¯
j
ij = Π¯
i
ij . If
we also have constant marginal costs, all second derivatives of Cˆi(p1, p2,∆i)
are constant. Therefore Cˆi
pi∆
= Cˆj
pj∆
. Remember also that
∣∣Π¯iii∣∣ > ∣∣∣Π¯iij∣∣∣,∣∣∣Cˆipi∆
∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣Cˆipj∆
∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣∂xi∂pi
∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∂xi∂pj
∣∣∣ . All this implies that
π¯i∆i∆j =
1((
Π¯iii
)2
−
(
Π¯iij
)2)2
[(
Π¯iij
)3 (
Cˆipi∆
)2
+
(
Cˆipi∆
)2
Π¯iij
(
Π¯iii
)2
−
(
Cˆipi∆
)2 (
Π¯iij
)3
− Cˆipj∆
(
Π¯iii
)3
Cˆipi∆ + Cˆ
i
pj∆Π¯
i
iiCˆ
i
pi∆
(
Π¯iij
)2]
=
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
Π¯iij
(
Π¯iii
)2
− Cˆi
pj∆
(
Π¯iii
)3
Cˆi
pi∆
+ Cˆi
pj∆
Π¯iiiCˆ
i
pi∆
(
Π¯iij
)2
((
Π¯iii
)2
−
(
Π¯iij
)2)2
=
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2 (
Π¯iii
)3
((
Π¯iii
)2
−
(
Π¯iij
)2)2

Π¯iij
Π¯iii
−
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
+
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Π¯iij
Π¯iii
)2
=
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2 (
Π¯iii
)3
((
Π¯iii
)2
−
(
Π¯iij
)2)2

1
2
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
−
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
+
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi

1
2
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi


2

=
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2 (
Π¯iii
)3
((
Π¯iii
)2
−
(
Π¯iij
)2)2
[
1
2
γ −
1
4
γ3
]
< 0
since γ = −
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
is between zero and one and Π¯iii < 0. Notice that γ measures
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the degree of product differentiation and is bounded between 0 (independent
goods) and 1 (perfect substitutes).
C Proof of Proposition 4
For later use we need to compute ψ¯
i
∆i∆j and ψ¯
i
∆j∆j . Differentiating (29) we
obtain
ψ¯
i
∆i∆j =
Π¯iijCˆ
j
pj∆
Cˆi
pipi∆
Π¯jjj(
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
)2
ψ¯
i
∆j∆j =
(
−RˆiijCˆ
j
pj∆∆
)(
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
i
ijΠ¯
j
ij
)
+ Π¯iijCˆ
j
pj∆
Cˆ
j
pjpj∆
Π¯iii(
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
i
ijΠ¯
j
ij
)2
Note that ψ¯
i
∆i∆j is zero for constant marginal costs with respect to output and
ψ¯
i
∆j∆j is zero for marginal costs that are constant with respect to output and
linear with respect to R&D.
For the first part of the proof, we will follow similar steps as the proof of
proposition 1. We start by differentiating totally the two first order conditions
given by (32) and (33). Using Cramer’s rule:
d∆i
ds1
=
−π¯
j
∆j∆j
π¯i
∆is1
+ π¯i
∆i∆j
π¯
j
∆js1
π¯i
∆i∆i
π¯
j
∆j∆j
− π¯i
∆i∆j
π¯
j
∆i∆j
(45)
To obtain the value of expressions in (41) we need to obtain the total effect of
subsidies on marginal revenues (including the effect on the last (price compe-
tition) stage). We have
dRˆij(p
i, pj)
d∆i
= Rˆiij(p
i, pj)ψ¯
i
∆i + Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψ¯
j
∆i < 0
dRˆij(p
i, pj)
d∆j
= Rˆiij(p
i, pj)ψ¯
i
∆j + Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψ¯
j
∆j < 0
dRˆij(p
i, pj)
ds1
= Rˆiij(p
i, pj)ψ¯
i
s1 + Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψ¯
j
s1 < 0
where the inequalities are obtained from (20), (21), (28), (29), (30) and (31).
Turn next to the total effect of R&D on marginal costs:
dCˆi
pj
(pi, pj,∆i)
d∆i
=
= Cˆipipj (p
i, pj,∆i)ψ¯
i
∆i + Cˆ
i
pjpj (p
i, pj,∆i)ψ¯
j
∆i + Cˆ
i
pj∆(p
i, pj ,∆i) < 0
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dCˆi
pj
(pi, pj,∆i)
d∆j
= Cˆipipj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
i
∆j + Cˆ
i
pjpj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
j
∆j = 0
dCˆi
pj
(pi, pj ,∆i)
ds1
= Cˆipipj (p
i, pj,∆i)ψ¯
i
s1 + Cˆ
i
pjpj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
j
s1 = 0
where the inequalities are derived from (22), (23), (28), (29), (30) and (31). We
also assume linear demand and constant marginal cost with respect to output
(so that Cˆi
pjpj
= Cˆi
pipj
= 0). Finally, note that for linear demands, the slope of
the demand function is not influenced by R&D (equation 44)
Using these inequalities we can now turn to the elements of (45). We
will use the fact that, for linear demands, Π¯iij = Rˆ
i
ij and both are quadratic
with constant second derivatives with respect to prices. Therefore, Π¯iii = Π¯
j
jj
and Π¯jij = Π¯
i
ij . If we also have constant marginal costs, all second deriva-
tives of Cˆi(p1, p2,∆i) are constant. Therefore Cˆi
pi∆
= Cˆj
pj∆
. For linear de-
mand and constant marginal costs we have ψ¯
i
∆j∆j = ψ¯
i
∆i∆j =
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj ,∆i)
d∆j
=
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj ,∆i)
ds1
=
d
(
∂xi
∂pi
)
d∆j
= Cˆi∆∆ = 0. Remember also that
∣∣Π¯iii∣∣ > ∣∣∣Π¯iij∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∂xi∂pi
∣∣∣ >∣∣∣∂xi∂pj
∣∣∣, and that assumption (18) means ∣∣∣Cˆipi∆
∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣Cˆipj∆
∣∣∣. All these imply that
π¯1∆1∆1 =
(
Rˆ12 − Cˆ
1
p2 + s
1
(
∂x2
∂p1
))
ψ¯
2
∆1∆1
+ψ¯
2
∆1

dRˆ12(p2, p1)
d∆1
−
dCˆ1
p2
(p2, p1,∆1)
d∆1
+ s1
d
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
d∆1


−Cˆ1p1∆ψ¯
1
∆1 − Cˆ
1
p2∆ψ¯
2
∆1 − Cˆ
1
∆∆ − φ
1
11
= ψ¯
2
∆1
(
Rˆ112ψ¯
1
∆1 − Cˆ
1
p2∆
)
− Cˆ1p1∆ψ¯
1
∆1 − Cˆ
1
p2∆ψ¯
2
∆1 − φ
1
11
=
−Π221Cˆ
1
p1∆
Π222Π
1
11 −Π
1
21Π
2
21
(
Rˆ112Π
2
22Cˆ
1
p1∆
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
− Cˆ1p2∆
)
−Cˆ1p1∆
Π222Cˆ
1
p1∆
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
− Cˆ1p2∆
−Π221Cˆ
1
p1∆
Π222Π
1
11 −Π
1
21Π
2
21
− φ111
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=
−ΠiijCˆ
i
pi∆(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2

Πiij ΠiiiCˆipi∆(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2 − Cˆipj∆


−Cˆipi∆
ΠiiiCˆ
i
pi∆(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2 − Cˆipj∆ −Π
i
ijCˆ
i
pi∆(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2 − φ111
=
(
Πiii
)3 (
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2 ×

Πiij
Πiii
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
−
(
Πiij
Πiii
)3
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
− 1
+
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
Πiij
Πiii
−
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiij
Πiii
)3− φ111
=
(
Πiii
)3 (
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2 ×



1
2
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi

 ∂xi∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
−

1
2
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi


3
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
− 1
+
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi

1
2
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi

− ∂x
i
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi

1
2
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi


3
− φ111
=
(
Πiii
)3 (
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
1
2
γ2 −
1
8
γ4 − 1 +
1
2
γ2 −
1
8
γ4
]
− φ111
=
(
Πiii
)3 (
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
γ2 −
1
4
γ4 − 1
]
− φ111 (46)
where γ = −
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
measures the degree of product differentiation as in the proof
of proposition 3.
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π¯2∆2∆2 =
(
Rˆ21 − Cˆ
2
p1
)
ψ¯
1
∆2∆2
+ψ¯
1
∆2
(
dRˆ21(p
1, p2)
d∆2
−
dCˆ2
p1
(p1, p2,∆2)
d∆2
)
−Cˆ2p2∆ψ¯
2
∆2 − Cˆ
2
p1∆ψ¯
1
∆2 − Cˆ
2
∆∆ − φ
2
11
= ψ¯
1
∆2
(
Rˆ212ψ¯
2
∆2 − Cˆ
2
p1∆
)
− Cˆ2p2∆ψ¯
2
∆2 − Cˆ
2
p1∆ψ¯
1
∆2 − φ
2
11
= π¯1∆1∆1
π¯1∆1s1 =
(
Rˆ12 − Cˆ
1
p2 + s
1
(
∂x1
∂p2
))
ψ¯
2
∆1s1
+ψ¯
2
∆1
(
dRˆ12(p
1, p2)
ds1
−
dCˆ1
p2
(p1, p2,∆1)
ds1
+
(
∂x1
∂p2
))
−Cˆ1p1∆ψ¯
1
s1 − Cˆ
1
p2∆ψ¯
2
s1
= ψ¯
2
∆1
(
Rˆ112ψ¯
1
s1 +
(
∂x1
∂p2
))
− Cˆ1p1∆ψ¯
1
s1 − Cˆ
1
p2∆ψ¯
2
s1
=
−Π221Cˆ
1
p1∆
Π222Π
1
11 −Π
1
21Π
2
21

− Rˆ112Π222
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
+
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
+Cˆ1p1∆
Π222
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
− Cˆ1p2∆
Π212
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
=
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2 ×

−Πiij
Πiii
∂x1
∂p2
∂x1
∂p1
+
∂x1
∂p2
∂x1
∂p1
(
Πiij
Πiii
)3
+1−
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
Πiij
Πiii
+
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiij
Πiii
)3
=
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
−
1
2
γ2 +
1
8
γ4 + 1−
1
2
γ2 +
1
8
γ4
]
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=(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
−γ2 +
1
4
γ4 + 1
]
> 0 (47)
π¯2∆2s1 =
(
Rˆ21 − Cˆ
2
p1
)
ψ¯
1
∆2s1 + ψ¯
1
∆2
(
dRˆ21(p
1, p2)
ds1
−
dCˆ2
p1
(p1, p2,∆2)
ds1
)
−Cˆ2p2∆ψ¯
2
s1 − Cˆ
2
p1∆ψ¯
1
s1
= ψ¯
1
∆2Rˆ
2
21(p
1, p2)ψ¯
2
s1 − Cˆ
2
p2∆ψ¯
2
s1 − Cˆ
2
p1∆ψ¯
1
s1
=
−Π112Cˆ
2
p2∆
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12

Rˆ221 Π
2
12
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12


−Cˆ2p2∆
Π212
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
− Cˆ2p1∆
−Π222
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
=
−ΠiijCˆ
i
pi∆(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2


(
Πiij
)2 (
∂x1
∂p1
)
(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2


−Cˆipi∆
Πiij
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2 − Cˆipj∆ −Π
i
ii
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2
=
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
1((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2 ×
[
−
(
Πiij
)3
Cˆipi∆ − Cˆ
i
pi∆Π
i
ij
(
Πiii
)2
+Cˆipi∆
(
Πiij
)3
+ Cˆipj∆
(
Πiii
)3
− Cˆipj∆Π
i
ii
(
Πiij
)2]
=
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2

−Πiij
Πiii
+
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
−
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiij
Πiii
)2
=
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
−
1
2
γ +
1
4
γ3
]
< 0 (48)
The second order condition (34) means that π¯i
∆i∆i
< 0, whereas the stabil-
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ity condition (35) implies
(
π¯i
∆i∆i
)2
>
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2
. Also, from proposition 3:
π¯1∆1∆2 = π¯
2
∆2∆1 =
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2 (
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
1
2
γ −
1
4
γ3
]
< 0 (49)
All these imply:
d∆1
ds1
=
−π¯i
∆i∆i
π¯1∆1s1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j
π¯2∆2s1(
π¯i
∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2 > 0 (50)
and
d∆2
ds1
=
−π¯i
∆i∆i
π¯2∆2s1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j
π¯1∆1s1(
π¯i
∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2 < 0 (51)
Which is the statement of the proposition.
From (46), (47), (48) and (49), we can also derive the following relation-
ships, to be used later:
π¯1∆1s1
(
−
Cˆi
pi∆
∂x1
∂p1
)
− φ111 = θπ¯
1
∆1s1 − φ
1
11 = π¯
i
∆i∆i (52)
π¯2∆2s1
(
−
Cˆi
pi∆
∂x1
∂p1
)
= θπ¯2∆2s1 = π¯
i
∆i∆j (53)
π¯1∆1s1
π¯i
∆i∆j
=
1
θ
[
γ2 − 14γ
4 − 1
][
1
2γ −
1
4γ
3
] (54)
π¯2∆2s1θ
[
γ2 − 14γ
4 − 1
][
1
2γ −
1
4γ
3
] − φ111 = π¯i∆i∆i (55)
D Proof of Corollary 5
Note, first, that from (47) and (48),
∣∣π¯1∆1s1∣∣ > ∣∣π¯2∆2s1∣∣ for γ between 0 and 1.
Also, from (50) and (51):
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∣∣∣∣d∆1ds1
∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣d∆2ds1
∣∣∣∣
=
d∆1
ds1
+
d∆2
ds1
=
−π¯i
∆i∆i
π¯1∆1s1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j
π¯2∆2s1(
π¯i
∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2 + −π¯i∆i∆i π¯2∆2s1 + π¯i∆i∆j π¯1∆1s1(
π¯i
∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2
=
−π¯i
∆i∆i
(
π¯1∆1s1 + π¯
2
∆2s1
)
+ π¯i
∆i∆j
(
π¯1∆1s1 + π¯
2
∆2s1
)
(
π¯i
∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2
=
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆i
− π¯i
∆i∆j
) (
π¯1∆1s1 + π¯
2
∆2s1
)
(
π¯i
∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2
= −
π¯1∆1s1 + π¯
2
∆2s1
π¯i
∆i∆i
+ π¯i
∆i∆j
> 0
where the inequality comes from the denominator being negative ((34) and
proposition 3), π¯1∆1s1 > 0 by (47) and
∣∣π¯1∆1s1∣∣ > ∣∣π¯2∆2s1∣∣.
E Derivation of equation (37)
Recall that from the first order condition in the R&D stage, π¯1∆1 = 0, and also,
π¯1s1 =
[
Rˆ12(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p2(p
1, p2,∆) + s1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)]
ψ¯
2
s1(∆
1,∆2, s1) + x1
= m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
s1 + x
1
π¯1∆2 =
[
Rˆ12(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p2(p
1, p2,∆) + s1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)]
ψ¯
2
∆2(∆
1,∆2, s1)
= m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
∆2
dψ¯
1
ds1
= ψ¯
1
∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ ψ¯
1
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
1
s1
and
dψ¯
2
ds1
= ψ¯
2
∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1 .
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where m1 ≡ p1 − ∂C
1
∂x1
+ s1. The last two expressions capture the total effect
of the output subsidy on prices. They take into account that the subsidy also
affects the choice of R&D by both firms in the second stage (and these, in turn,
affect prices). This effect (through R&D) is reflected in the first two terms of
the expression.
With these expressions we can rewrite ∂B¯
1
∂s1
:
∂B¯1
∂s1
= m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
s1 − s
1
[
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
+
∂x1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
]
This is expression (37) in the main text.
F Proof of Lemma 6
Before proving the statement of the lemma, we need to derive the restrictions
on φi11 implied by the second order condition (34) and the stability condition
(35).
From the definition of π¯i
∆i∆i
in (46), in order to satisfy the second order
condition π¯i
∆i∆i
< 0 we need to ensure
φi11 >
(
Πiii
)3 (
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
γ2 −
1
4
γ4 − 1
]
= θπ¯1∆1s1 > 0
where θ = −
Cˆi
pi∆
∂xi
∂pi
= −∂
2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi
measures how fast marginal costs are reduced
per unit of R&D.
On the other hand, the stability condition in (35) translates into:
π¯i∆i∆i
π¯i∆i∆j
=
(Πiii)
3
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
(
(Πiii)
2
−(Πiij)
2
)2
[
γ2 − 14γ
4 − 1
]
− φ111
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
(Πiii)
3
(
(Πiii)
2
−(Πiij)
2
)2
[
−12γ + γ −
1
4γ
3
] > 1
=
[
γ2 − 14γ
4 − 1
][
1
2γ −
1
4γ
3
] − φi11
π¯i∆i∆j
> 1
using (54):
φi11 + π¯
i
∆i∆j > π¯
i
∆i∆j
[
γ2 − 14γ
4 − 1
][
1
2γ −
1
4γ
3
]
φi11 > θπ¯
1
∆1s1 − π¯
i
∆i∆j > 0 (56)
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Since πi∆i∆j < 0, then only (56) is binding..
From the definition of d∆1
ds1
and d∆
2
ds1
(50), (51) and the identities (52), (53),
(54) and (55) we have
d∆1
ds1
=
−π¯i
∆i∆i
π¯1∆1s1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j
π¯2∆2s1(
π¯i
∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2 =
(
−θπ¯1∆1s1 + φ
1
11
)
π¯1∆1s1 +
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2
θ(
θπ¯1
∆1s1
− φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2
=
1
θ
(
−
(
θπ¯1∆1s1
)2
+ φ111θπ¯
1
∆1s1 +
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2)
(
θπ¯1
∆1s1
− φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2 > 0
d∆2
ds1
=
−π¯i
∆i∆i
π¯2∆2s1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j
π¯1∆1s1(
π¯i
∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2
=
(
−θπ¯1∆1s1 + φ
1
11
) π¯i
∆i∆j
θ
+ π¯i
∆i∆j
π¯1∆1s1(
θπ¯1
∆1s1
− φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2
=
1
θ
φ111π¯
i
∆i∆j(
θπ¯1
∆1s1
− φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2 < 0 (57)
Notice that all the terms in the expressions above do not depend on φ111 except,
of course φ111. Taking the derivative with respect to φ
1
11
∂ d∆
1
ds1
∂φ111
=
θπ¯1∆1s1
[(
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2]
θ
((
θπ¯1
∆1s1
− φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2)2
+
2
(
−
(
θπ¯1∆1s1
)2
+ φ111θπ¯
1
∆1s1 +
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2) (
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)
θ
((
θπ¯1
∆1s1
− φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2)2
=
1
θ
((
θπ¯1
∆1s1
− φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2)2 ×
[
−
(
θπ¯1∆1s1
)3
+ θπ¯1∆1s1
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2
+2φ111
(
θπ¯1∆1s1
)2
−
(
φ111
)2
θπ¯1∆1s1 − 2φ
1
11
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2]
= −
1
θ
(
θπ¯1∆1s1
) (
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
+
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2 (
2φ111 − θπ¯
1
∆1s1
)
((
θπ¯1
∆1s1
− φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2)2 < 0
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∂ d∆
2
ds1
∂φ111
=
1
θ
π¯i
∆i∆j
[(
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2]
+ 2φ111π¯
i
∆i∆j
(
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)
((
θπ¯1
∆1s1
− φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2)2
=
1
θ
((
θπ¯1
∆1s1
− φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2)2 ×
{
π¯i∆i∆j
[(
θπ¯1∆1s1
)2
− 2θφ111π¯
1
∆1s1 +
(
φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2]
+2φ111π¯
i
∆i∆jθπ¯
1
∆1s1 − 2φ
1
11π¯
i
∆i∆jφ
1
11
}
=
1
θ
π¯i
∆i∆j
[(
θπ¯1∆1s1
)2
−
(
φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2]
((
θπ¯1
∆1s1
− φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2)2
= −
1
θ
π¯i
∆i∆j
[(
φ111
)2
−
(
θπ¯1∆1s1 − π¯
i
∆i∆j
) (
θπ¯1∆1s1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j
)]
((
θπ¯1
∆1s1
− φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i
∆i∆j
)2)2
> 0
where the inequalities are derived using (56). Since d∆
1
ds1
> 0 and d∆
2
ds1
< 0, the
statement of the proposition follows
G Proof of Proposition 7
Rewrite the optimal subsidy as
s1∗ = m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
+ ∂x
1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
(58)
where m1 = p1 − ∂C
1
∂x1
+ s1 > 0 is the gross benefit per unit sold, including the
output subsidy. Of course, m1 has to be positive (otherwise firm 1 would have
negative profits).
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Turn now to the sign of the denominator in (58). It is positive since
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
+
∂x1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
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where the inequality comes from d∆
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(Proposition 4) and
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Therefore the sign of s1∗ is the same as the sign of ψ¯
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Using equation (27) we have:
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(i.e. the R&D stage effect). From lemma 6,
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From (57) we have
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By continuity, the claim of the proposition follows.
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